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This dissertation investigates the market reaction, parameterized by Cumulative 
Abnormal Returns (CARs), to transactions performed by insiders of companies listed 
on PSI-Geral, assuming these trades have important information content, and 
outsiders believe on the superior information insiders’ possess. An event-study 
methodology to measure the impact of these trades on a 50-working day window is 
used. Purchases (sales) are followed by positive (negative) statistically significant 
abnormal returns, and the strongest market reaction is felt on the days following the 
communication of trades to CMVM. To control for other specific insider and firm 
characteristics, a cross-sectional regression framework was run and was found strong 
relation between volume of transaction, holdings of insiders, firm size, book to market 
ratios and CARs. Results also show improvements on the enforcement of insider 
trading legislations, in comparison with past legal frameworks. 
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1.Introduction 
Empirical research proves that insiders of quoted companies are, in general, 
superiorly informed when compared with other investors. They have deep knowledge 
on company’s daily operations; they take day-to-day decisions that influence the 
present results and future prospects of the company. Outside investors acknowledge 
this and react mimicking their transactions (Jaffe, 1974, Gregory et al., 1994 and 1997, 
Lakonishok and Lee, 2001, Del Brio et al., 2002, Fidrmuc at al., 2006, and others). 1 
Discussion on the positive and negative aspects of insider trading has been 
intense on last decades. Supporters of insider trading as Manne, 1966, Carlton and 
Fischel, 1983, argue it is a vehicle to convey useful and timely information into stock 
prices, reflecting, more precisely, the true value of the company. Also, investment 
decisions would become less risky due to more stock price transparency (Leland, 
1992). More recently, some argued that reinforcement of insider trading legislation 
contributes to better stock price informativeness (Fernandes and Ferreira, 2008), and 
stock price accuracy (Beny, 2005). Aktas and de Bodt, 2008, refer that “price discovery 
is hastened on insider trading days”. However, opponents insist that insider trading 
decreases market liquidity, Leland, 1992, Fish and Robe, 2004; outsiders have limited 
gains, as they are trading against better-informed investors, Brudney, 1979, Del Brio et 
al., 2002; moreover induces abusive managerial behaviors, Manove, 1989.  
In Portugal, laws concerning insider trading are in line with the European Union 
directives, the current legislation dictates the prohibition of insider trading when in 
possession of insider private information.2 Issuer companies are obliged to notify 
insiders’ trades to CMVM (Comissão do Mercado de Valores Mobiliários, equivalent to 
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission). The 2006 Market Abuse Reform legislation 
                                                          
1
 According with to the Article 378-1 of the Portuguese Securities Code (PSC), in Portuguese: Código dos 
Valores Mobiliários, Insider is “Any person who possesses insider information by virtue of his: 
membership of the administrative, management or supervisory bodies of the issuer; or having access to 
the information through the permanent or occasional exercise of his employment, profession or duties 
in respect of the issuer (…). And by the 248-B-4a): “a person closely associated with a person discharging 
managerial responsibilities”: spouse, dependent children, and “other relatives who have shared the 
same household as that person for at least one year”. 
2
 According with the Article 378-3 of the Portuguese Securities Code (PSC), insider information is 
“information of a precise nature, which has not been made public (…) likely to have a significant effect 
on their market”. 
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reinforced the mechanisms to prevent the abuse of private information, by regulating 
the communication of insiders and demanding companies to create a list of all insiders 
with access to private information. CMVM makes these transactions public, through 
his website, allowing the access to common investors, since October 2008. CMVM’s 
publication Contra-Ordenações e Crimes no Mercado de Valores Mobiliários, 2009, 
referred that, since 1997, there were only 6 court trials on insider trading which 
resulted in penalties.3 This raises questions on the effectiveness on the application of 
these laws.  
Even though insiders might not be breaking the law by trading on information 
which is considered to be private and price sensitive, outsiders believe insider trades 
may have important information content, and so abnormal market movements are 
expected on following days. This thesis analyzes the market reaction on the days 
following the transaction of stocks by insiders, for companies listed in PSI-Geral (the 
General Portuguese Index). The main hypothesis to answer is if there is a strong and 
statistically significant market reaction on insider transactions, measured by Abnormal 
Returns (AR), through an event-study methodology.  
This topic is not deeply covered in the Portuguese context. A relevant study was 
made by Gonçalves and Duque, 2008, with data corresponding to the period before 
the 2006’s Reform, in this way, is important to study the actual impact that new 
regulations brought into the Portuguese stock market. Gonçalves and Duque, 2008, 
used the period of January 2001 and December 2005. Results of their study are 
different as they do not find any market reaction; inferring that abnormal returns are 
solely due to inside information. On the analyzed period, data on insider transactions 
was only collectable by going through companies’ annual reports, thus eliminating the 
possibility for outsider to timely react and profit, by mimicking insiders’ trades. They 
show the presence of abnormal returns on days around trades, timing ability of 
insiders and weaker impact for sales. They also made a robustness check, aggregating 
transactions performed with less than 5 days of interval, with no modifications on 
main findings and conclusion. Other research by Portuguese authors is about the 
                                                          
3
 In English: “Offenses and crimes on the Stock Market”. Translation suggested by the author of the 
dissertation. 
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impact that insider trading laws have on stock price Informativeness, on different 
groups of countries: developed markets, emerging and poor “legal institutions” 
(Fernandes and Ferreira, 2008).      
Findings suggest that insiders are able to earn significant abnormal returns on 
the days following the transaction of stocks. Their superior information makes 
outsiders to invest on the same direction, provoking a market reaction.  CARs are much 
stronger some days after the transaction, coinciding, with the average delay that 
insiders take to report their transactions, proving that the market reacts to the 
communication of insider trades. CARs’ magnitudes are almost 2% for purchases and 
3% for sales, on the first two months after the insider transaction. Market reaction is 
stronger when an insider reports its trades on time, giving more importance to recent 
transactions which convey fresher and more reliable information about the firm.  
Results for the cross-sectional regression, indicates that volume of transaction 
and insiders’ holdings are positively associated with CARs, inversely, the firm size is 
negatively associated. Insiders’ sales on overvalued companies (low book to market 
ratio) have a strong negative market reaction. Robustness checks are performed to see 
whether results remained the same or if they were influenced by these distorting 
features. In this way, two subsamples were tested: 1) a sample, in which all the 
transactions that were reported with delay were removed. 2) the largest transactions 
were removed to prevent biased results when including extremely large transactions. 
 Additionally, it seems that new legislation contributed to more stock price 
informativeness, evidenced by significant market reactions after the reporting date. 
The rest of the dissertation is organized in the following way: the Section 2 
gives a brief overview on previous research on the subject. Section 3.1 describes how 
the data was collected and the type of methodology that was used on event-study 
analysis. Section 3.2 presents and interprets the empirical results for the event-study. 
Section 4.1 explains the methodology used and the intuition behind variables chosen 
for cross-sectional regression. Section 4.2 shows results for the latter section.  Section 
5 reflects on some limitations concerning this dissertation. Finally, section 6 draws the 
conclusions on the empirical research. 
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2. Literature Review 
There are two main different approaches on the empirical literature about 
insider trading: 1) the examination of the impact on the market of insider transactions, 
2) an examination of the impact of insider transactions, on cases where insiders were 
prosecuted by using private information. From the first approach: Rogoff, 1964, Glass, 
1966 and Lorie and Niederhoffer, 1968, find out that the securities bought (sold) by 
insiders tend to perform better (worse) in the following months after transaction. 
Later, other studies confirmed these results: Pratt and De Vere, 1970, Jaffe, 1974 and 
Finnerty, 1976.  
In more recent studies similar results are drawn: Fidrmuc, et al., 2006, for the 
UK market, conclude that purchases and sales are followed by significant abnormal 
returns, due to market reaction. Bajo and Petracci (2006), for Italian market, 
conducted a study centered on the changes of shareholders’ stakes, finding statistical 
evidence of AR when the ownership was incremented. They also built a profitable 
strategy to go long after ownership increase and short otherwise. Del Brio, et al., 2002, 
for the Spanish market, concluded that strong form of the Efficient Market Hypothesis 
does not hold, since insiders can outperform markets consistently, supporting semi-
strong form, questioning the effectiveness of insider trading laws.  
Degryse, et al., 2009, studied the Dutch market, concluding that “legal insider 
trading is an important channel through which information flows to the market”, Inci 
et al., 2010, and Tavakoli et al., 2012, got the same conclusions. Former authors 
referred that a larger transaction volume is associated with negative market reaction. 
In the opposite Jeng, et al., 2003, and Fidrmuc, et al., 2006, found the inverse effect, 
arguing superior information of insiders. Jeng et al., 2003, use performance evaluation 
methods based on mutual fund’s literature. They form portfolios by buying (selling) 
stocks, according with the buy (sell) signal of insiders; they found that insiders earn 
abnormal return over than 6% per year. Betzer and Theissen, 2008, carry out a 
different study: focused on reporting delays for the German market, they concluded 
that abnormal returns are independent of these delays, implying that the price is 
distorted between the insider trading and the reporting date. 
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Finally, others give attention to the SEC sanctions analyzing the impact of illegal 
insider trading. Studies demonstrated the relationship between abnormal 
performances and the evidenced exploitation of private information: Meulbroek, 1992, 
Cornell and Sirri, 1992, Chakravarty and McConnell, 1999. Meulbroek concludes that 
there is statistically significant and economically large abnormal return on insider 
trading day and that almost half of the pre-announcement stock price run-up observed 
occurs on insider trading days. 
3. Event Study 
3.1. Sampling and methodology 
This sample consists on hand-collected data taken from reports provided by 
CMVM. These reports contain all the insider transactions on companies quoted in PSI-
Geral, between October 2008 and February 2012, inclusive. The study starts on 
October 2008 since information of insider trading only became public after that date, 
on CMVM website. According with the actual Decree-Law 52/2010, CMVM requires 
insiders to report their transactions informing on the nature, date, price, amount, 
issuing company, financial instrument in question, reason for the responsibility to 
notify and, the number of shares held after trades. Despite of the obligation of 
reporting their trades within 5 working days4, insiders take, in average, 24 and 12 
working days for purchases and sales, respectively. 
The reports included all the transactions directly or indirectly made by insiders, 
i.e. also included transactions made by third-parties: family members or companies on 
behalf of insiders. Due to the characteristics of the sample there were only chosen 
transactions performed directly by insiders or family members (spouses mainly). In this 
sample, the great majority of transactions made by companies on behalf of insiders 
have small information content, as they are mainly made by associated companies. 
These trades (mostly purchases) are constant over long periods of time, reasons to 
believe they are made to maintain market liquidity, or increase ownership of the issuer 
company. To not be biased when filtering indirect trades (according with their 
information value), all these transactions were discarded (Table I). 
                                                          
4
 According with Article 248-B of the Portuguese Securities Code (PSC). 
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Initially the number of event entries was 12,335. Some observations that not 
contain valuable information to outsiders were excluded, the same intuition used by 
Del Brio et al., 2002, Gonçalves and Duque, 2008, Betzer and Theissen, 2010, and 
others. Table I show the reasons of excluding observations. Incongruent or incomplete 
data was excluded, as well as, transactions referred to inheritances, gifts, donations, 
stock permutations, exercise of stock options or participation on programs of 
performance incentive or capital increase. Additionally transactions made by other 
companies on behalf of insiders, were excluded.  
Finally, observations were aggregated: when for the same company, there is 
more than one trade, at a given day, they are aggregated forming one event, the net 
volume of trades indicate the direction of the trade (more purchases than sales means 
positive net volume, indicating a purchase event, and vice-versa). This type of 
Table I: Reasons for excluding observations 
This table shows the sequence of exclusion of observations to get the final sample to be used 
on event-study. The first column explains the reasons behind the exclusion of observations. 
The second shows the number of observations excluded. The third gives the information of 
the observations left after each exclusion. 
Reasons for Exclusion 
 
Observations 
excluded 
Remaining 
Data 
-Initial number of observations  12,335 
-Observations with to incongruent date or transactions before the 
chosen period (2/1/2008). 
21 12,314 
-For observations with no event date 93 12,221 
-Volume of transaction equal to zero 6 12,215 
-For entries when the transaction is: a transmission, inheritance, gift, 
donation, exercise of stock options, purchases/sales of rights, under 
any program of incentives, or on capital increases, stock permutations 
1,475 10,738 
-For entries when Price equals to zero 13 10,725 
-Transactions that were made by companies whose insiders are on both 
boards. 
8,571 2,154 
-Deleted transactions which net volume by company and by transaction 
date equals to zero. 
29 2,125 
-If at a given day two or more insiders, from the same company, make 
one transaction. The direction of the trade (sale or purchase) depends 
on the net volume of transactions. 
1,387 738 
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aggregation is widely used to perform event-study in the empirical literature in this 
subject, Degryse et al., 2009, Gonçalves and Duque, 2008, Betzer and Theissen, 2010, 
are some examples. After exclusions, the total number of events to run the event-
study analysis was 738, 532 of which were purchases and 206 were sales. 
Banco Santander, Banco Popular and Sacyr Vallehermo, Spanish companies 
listed on Psi-Geral, were introduced into analysis. Companies whose historical prices 
were not sufficient to run an event study analysis were discarded, not taking part in 
the initial number of observations: ESFN, Estoril Sol, Media Capital, Grão-Pará, Vista 
Alegre, Vista Alegre Fusão, Salvador Caetano, COMAE, Fisipe, Lisgrafica and Orey. In 
the end, there was a final sample of 33 companies.  
Other data: company and market returns, shares outstanding, market 
capitalization, book value per shares, were extracted from Bloomberg, for the event-
study and cross-sectional regression framework, on the period comprehended 
between July 2007 and mid of March 2012, inclusive.   
This dissertation followed the event-study methodology of Campbell, Lo, and 
MacKinlay, 1997, the same method used by the other researches on insider trading. 
This method was applied to test whether the abnormal returns are significantly 
different from zero on the insider trading day (Day 0) and on the following and 
preceding period. The length of estimation period is 180 trading days, the event period 
extends for 71 days: 20 days before the event, 50 days after and the event day itself. 
The selection of postevent period, took in account that: 1) the reporting delay for 
purchases is almost 24 working days and it is interesting to study the 1-month market 
reaction after reporting, 2) the majority of the empirical literature uses a two months 
period (Del Brio et al., 2002), 3) a larger event window may be biased by the market 
reactions of other events. The market model is used, with PSI-Geral as a proxy for the 
market return. Events are divided into purchases and sales, and for each event 
equations (1) and (2) are computed:                                                                    
                                                                         (1) 
where ri,t+1  is the expected return for security i on t+1, rm,t+1 represents the market 
return on day t+1, αi and βi are, respectively, the intercept and the slope for security i 
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on day t+1, ei,t+1 is the error term. These parameters are determined through an OLS 
(Ordinary Least Square) regression model of security returns on market returns during 
the estimation period.5 The parameters αi and βi are used to calculate predicted 
returns, over the event period. Then, predicted returns, calculated by the regression, 
are subtracted to the actual returns, giving the abnormal returns (AR):  
                                                                                                     (2) 
where ARi,t is the abnormal return for security i on day T, ri,T is the actual return for 
security I,    i,t indicates the regressed return for the security i. Then abnormal returns 
are accumulated, by type of transaction, by each day of the event period: 
                                  
 
                                               (3) 
Finally, they are accumulated over the time and divided by the number of 
events to form          :  
                                           
 
 
       
    
  
                                 (5) 
where                      is the average cumulative abnormal return from day n to n+1, N 
is the number of events, n is the event day. To test the significance of          is used J1 
test statistic of Campbell, Lo, and MacKinlay, 1997. Calculations are described on 
equations (6), (7) and (8). 
            
   
  
   
  
                                                (6) 
                                                               (7) 
  
         
           
                                                       (8) 
where         is the standard deviation of abnormal returns on estimation window.            
is the standard deviation of average cumulative abnormal return. t is the result for the 
J1 test. 
                                                          
5
  All the calculations regarding regressions are performed by the statistical software, Stata 12. 
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3.2. Results 
This study supports the intuition that insiders are better informed in 
comparison with the common investor, and their purchases (sales) provokes a strong 
positive (negative) market reaction, on the days after the transaction. Outsiders 
believe that insiders trade because they know the future value of the company is 
about to change, so they trade on the same direction after acknowledging insiders’ 
trade. Results are in consonance with Pratt and De Vere, 1970, Jaffe, 1974 and 
Finnerty, 1976, Fidrmuc, et al., 2006, Degryse, et al., 2009, and others.  
Figure I represents the average CARs over the event window. In the vertical axis 
are the average CARs, in percentage, for purchases and sales, and on the horizontal 
axis, the event window days. Purchases are represented by the blue line and sales by 
the red dashed line. Markers show the level of significance for each average CARs (1, 5 
or 10%, according with J1 test). Graph illustrates the market reaction of outsiders after 
transactions performed by insiders and the timing ability of the latter. 
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Figure I: Average CARs for transactions over event window 
On the vertical axis, this graph shows the average CARs, aggregating all events for each day of 
event window. The horizontal axis it is described the total length of the event window. 
Markers are informing about significance. Note that both purchases and sales’ curves are 
normalized to be zero on the transaction date (t=0). 
         ○ 1% significant                                  □ 5% significant                          ∆ 10% significant 
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On Table II it is possible to see the magnitude and test statistics of average 
CARs, on several time intervals.  
For purchases, abnormal returns are decreasing until the transaction day, and then 
increasing until day 38. On the first 20 days, abnormal returns are weak and not 
statistical significant. The great market reaction is between the days 20 and 38 after 
the transaction (1.65%). This coincides with the average delay that insiders take to 
remit their reports to CMVM which, in this sample, is 24. From then until the end of 
the event window, the abnormal returns have a downward reaction.  
Conversely, for sales abnormal returns are increasing until the transaction day, and 
then decreasing until the end of the event window. To note that, the stronger market 
reaction happens between day 12 and day 34 (-2.65%), this coincides with the average 
delay for reporting sales, around 12 days. From then on results are not significant. 
Outsiders are receiving positive (negative) signals of insiders when they are buying 
(selling) stocks. They invest on the same direction, betting on the superior information 
that insiders may possess. These findings suggest that there is market reaction to the 
communication of transactions, in line with Del Brio, et al, 2002. 
  Seems that insiders wait for the right moment to buy and sell stocks, as they 
buy them when price is apparently low and sell when price is high, proved by 
statistically significant decline before purchases (-0.8%) and statistically significant 
Table II: Market reactions to insider trading over the event window 
This table shows average CARs for trades on specific time intervals over the event window. On 
the first three columns information regarding purchases of stocks, and on the remaining three, 
information relative to the sales. The symbols *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 
10%, 5% and 1%, respectively, for the J1 test.   
Purchases (N=532)  Sales (N=206) 
Interval (         ) 
 
t-stat  Interval (         ) 
 
t-stat 
AR (0) 0.08 
 
0.94 AR (0) 0.30 *** 2.47 
[0,20] 0.25 
 
0.65 [0,12] -0.01 
 
-0.02 
[20,38] 1.65 *** 4.57 [12,34] -2.65 *** -4.56 
[38,50] -0.48 * -1.59 [34,50] -0.04 
 
-0.09 
[0,50] 1.42 *** 2.40 [0,50] -2.68 *** -3.10 
[-20,30] 0.31 
 
0.52 [-20,30] -0.35 
 
-0.41 
[-20,-1] -0.80 ** -2.15 [-20,-1] 1.66 *** 3.07 
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increase before sales (1.66%). Insiders show good timing ability as stated by Friederich 
et al., 2000, Gonçalves and Duque, 2008, Degryse et al., 2009.  
Results are against the hypothesis that the absolute value of market reaction is 
larger for purchases than for sales. In fact, the absolute reaction for sales is superior on 
the post-event period (2.68% against 1.42%). The intuition for lower impact of sales, is 
that insiders may also sell due to liquidity needs, or in consequence of portfolio 
allocation strategy, rather than just on negative insider information (Lakonishok and 
Lee, 2001, Friederich, et al.,2002, Jeng, et al., 1999 and Fidrmuc, et al., 2006, Tavakoli 
et al. 2012). For Gonçalves and Duque, 2008, purchases are a stronger indicator for 
insider information on transactions than sales. 
To test the hypothesis of stronger market reaction after the trade report, an 
event study was run with the reporting day being the event day, instead. Table III 
represents the market reaction after transaction and reporting date. Significant 
positive abnormal returns were found for the first 5 days after reporting, for 
purchases, indicating that insiders are reacting to the reporting, but not on the first 
day ([0,1] interval is not significant), in line with Lakonishok and Lee, 2001 and 
McConnell et al.,2005, which stated that insiders take several days to realize the 
Table III: Market reactions on transaction date vs. reporting date 
This table shows average CARs for trades on specific time intervals over the event window. On 
the right-hand side, are added the event study results on reporting dates, i.e., when the day 
zero of the event window is the day of announcement. Symbols *, ** and *** denote statistical 
significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively, for the J1 test.  
Purchases 
Transaction date  Reporting date 
Interval (         )  t-stat (         )  t-stat 
[0,1] -0.03  -0.23 0.14  1.27 
[0,5] 0.05  0.25 0.28 * 1.54 
[-10,-1] -0.71 *** -2.70 -0.88 *** -3.48 
Sales 
Transaction date  Reporting date 
Interval (         )  t-stat  (         )  t-stat 
[0,1] 0.15  0.89  -0.04  -0.22 
[0,5] 0.32  1.08  0.16  0.47 
[-10,-1] 0.69 ** 1.81  1.05 *** 2.37 
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insider trade, even after it is reported. Notwithstanding, sales remained not 
statistically significant. 
To see if trades became more informative when the reporting date is closer to 
the transaction date, all the trades with a reporting delay bigger than 90 days and then 
all of them reported out of the required reporting period of 5 working days were 
removed (Table IV). Table IV shows the short-period market reaction, after controlling 
for delays. By taking all the trades with big delay, stronger market reactions were 
attained. Statistically significant abnormal returns were got on day 0 and on [0,5] 
interval. CARs’ magnitudes increased as delay mean diminished, proving that outsiders 
may value more the most recent information, having larger probabilities to earn profits 
on this information.  
In the full sample, more than 12% of the transactions were reported with more 
than 30 working days of delay. In theory, there would not be valuable information to 
be taken in a transaction made long time before its reporting. These checks did not 
impact sales, which was expected as the average reporting delay is lower (12 days). 
Results are consistent with Fidrmuc, et al., 2006. Gonçalves and Duque, 2008, referred 
the impossibility of outsider profits. During the analyzed period information on insider 
transactions, was only released annually (on companies’ annual reports), these results 
also evidence that 2006’s Reform brought more stock price informativeness. 
  
Table IV: Reporting Speed 
This table shows the average CARs (in %), for trades on specific time intervals over the event 
window. On 2nd group of columns are excluded trades with a report delay bigger than 90 days. 
On 3rd group of columns trades which were reported after the required reporting period are 
excluded. The symbols *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, 
respectively, for the J1 test.   
Purchases 
 Full sample  90 days  5 days 
Interval (         )  t-stat  (         )  t-stat  (         )  t-stat 
AR (0) 0.08  0.94 0.01  0.18 0.1 ** 1.75 
[0,1] 0.15  0.89 0.01  0.1 0.03  0.36 
[0,5] 0.32  1.08 0.22  1.15 0.21 * 1.54 
[0,10] 0.25  0.9 0.52 ** 1.98 0.67 *** 3.72 
 N= 532   N= 463 N= 340 
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4. Cross-sectional regression framework 
4.1. Methodology 
A cross-sectional regression was done to control for the explanatory properties 
of some variables. Contrary to the even-study analysis, in which each company had 
only the maximum of one event per day (purchase or sale depending on the net 
volume of transactions), in the cross-sectional regression, to account with specific 
information, the method of aggregation is different. Are taken in account all the 
transactions made by each insider, i.e., if two insiders of the same company, traded on 
the same day, there are two trades. If the same insider trades two times, both trades 
are aggregated; this aggregation is used by Degryse et al., 2009. This aggregation is 
done because each transaction may convey specific information on insider and firm 
characteristics that help to explain CARs.6 For example: the relation between the 
volume of transaction performed by the insider and CARs or the association between 
the specific size of a company and CARs. 
                                                                                       (9) 
where            is the cumulative abnormal return for the first 50 working days,    
is the matrix of all the regressors and   is the vector of error terms. Variables are 
subdivided in two types: continuous and dummies. For the continuous group of 
variables are used volume and holdings, for dummies: firm size, book to market ratio 
and ontime. Table V represents some characteristics of trades.7 
Volume is the ratio between the size, in volume, of the transaction and the 
number of shares outstanding at the moment of the trade. To compute this variable, 
all the transactions performed by a specific insider, on a certain date, on a certain 
company are aggregated (Table V).8  
                                                          
6
Characteristics of each insider are captured when regressing CARs with continuous variables: volume 
and prior holdings. The characteristics of the firm are captured by regressing with dummy variables: 
company size, book to market ratio and notification delay. 
7
 The length of the event window was chosen to be consistent with the event window of the event study 
analysis and is approximately 2 working months. 
8
 For example: if an insider buys 2000 stocks three times over a day, the aggregated purchase is 6000. 
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Holdings is the number of shares held by the insider, before any trade, divided 
by the number of shares outstanding at the moment of the trade. If a specific insider is 
trading more than one time in a day, is accounted the lowest value of holdings, of that 
day, if it is a purchase, and the highest value of holdings, if it is a sale (Table V).  
Dummies are divided in three different groups: size and book to market tertiles, 
and notification delays. To the size tertiles there are three variables: small firm, 
medium firm and big firm, companies are grouped in tertiles according to their market 
capitalization on the trading day. To the book to market tertiles, variables are 
subdivided in growth firm, mid bm and value firm, companies are grouped into 
Table V: Descriptive statistics of trades 
This table presents descriptive statistics on trades. Panel 1 represents statistics on size, volume and 
holdings relative to the shares outstanding. Some companies are not giving information on 
holdings, so the observation is smaller. Panel 2 represents statistics on the delay (number of 
working days that insiders take to report their trades after the transaction). On Panel 3 information 
of the number of different companies and insiders analyzed on the event study. 
Panel 1   All Trades Purchases Sales 
Number of Observations   973 732 241 
Size (Volume*Price) (€) 
mean 859,401 448,337 2,107,945 
median 55,095 23,602 150,750 
Volume (%) 
mean 0.02 0.01 0.04 
median 0.001 0.001 0.002 
Holdings (%) 
 
observations 580 451 129 
mean 1.38 1.72 0.18 
median 0.87 1.11 0.01 
     
Panel 2   All Trades Purchases Sales 
Number of Observations  976 735 241 
% of observations in each delay 
interval 
0 days 6.66 6.26 7.88 
0-5 days 72.23 70.34 78.01 
6-14 days 10.14 8.84 14.11 
15-30 days 5.43 6.26 2.90 
>30 days 12.19 14.56 4.98 
 Mean (days) 20.84 23.69 12.15 
 Median (days) 3.75 4 3 
     
Panel 3     
Number of companies 
Number of insiders Number of events 
Insiders Other insiders Third party Purchases Sales 
33 184 0 8 532 206 
20 
 
tertiles.9 Finally, ontime, taking the value of 1 if transaction was reported on time and 
0 if was reported with delay (Table V). 
Volume describes the size of the trade performed by the insider. Considering 
that an insider has superior information, makes sense that a larger size trade is related 
with the possession of important information about the future company prospects 
(Fidrmuc et al., 2006, Betzer and Theissen, 2008, and Gonçalves and Duque, 2008). 
Notwithstanding, this relation may broke when accounting with the highest-volume 
trades (Jaffe, 1974, Seyhun, 1986 and 1988, Pascutti, 1996). A large trade may be 
related with changes in ownership (a question of portfolio diversification for sales, or 
company control, for purchases) or liquidity needs (Jeng et al., 2003). Trades, 
motivated by these reasons, are not conveying useful insider information to outsiders. 
Insiders may also be splitting their trades, to reduce their hypothesis of being spotted 
by the legislator (Barclay and Warner (1993). 
Holdings is used to see the relation between the stake of an insider and the 
market reaction, is a proxy for insider relevance on the firm. Intuitively, an insider with 
a larger stake in a company is more informed about the good/bad prospects of the 
company. It is expected that the market will react positively towards the information 
that an important insider has traded. Fidrmuc et al. (2006) go further by also analyzing 
the outsider ownership, showing that presence of an outsider blockholder (families, 
other companies, individuals) that monitors the company, reduces the asymmetry of 
information and, consequently, the market reaction to directors’ trade. Conversely, 
the higher presence of institutional investors is increasing the impact of their 
transactions. This study is categorizing insiders accordingly with their position within 
the firm, which is a proxy for quality of possessed information. This division is not used 
on this thesis, due to insufficient data. 
Empirical research on company size concluded that insider trading in smaller 
firms conveys more information to the markets. The smaller the company is, the less 
attention receives from analysts, is more opaque so the asymmetry of information is 
                                                          
9
 Growth firm is the tertile with lowest book to market ratio (a growth company has, usually, a market 
value higher than the book value, so the ratio is smaller than in value fims), conversely value firm is the 
tertile with highest book to market ratio. 
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bigger. Conversely, a bigger company is intensively followed by analysts, becoming 
more transparent, so it is expected that insider transactions do not foster a strong 
market reaction by outsiders (Seyhun, 1986 and 1988, Lakonishok and Lee, 2001, Jeng 
et al., 2003, Gonçalves and Duque, 2008, Degryse, et al., 2009). 
Research on book to market (BM) ratios strongly evidence that firms with high 
BM ratios outperform those with low BM; this is called the value premium (Basu, 1977, 
Fama and French, 1993, Lakonishok, et al., 1994). Theoretically high BM firms (value 
firms – whose book value is higher than the market value) are being undervalued by 
the market and low BM firms (growth firms) are overvalued. Basic intuition tells that, if 
the market receives the information that an insider is purchasing undervalued stocks, 
reacts positively. In opposite, if an insider sells overvalued company stocks, it is 
because he thinks that the firm values less, thus the market reacts negatively 
(Friederich et al., 2002, Jenter 2005, Gonçalves and Duque, 2008).  
Ontime is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 when trades are reported on 
time, and zero inversely. This variable was included to see the market reaction when 
the trade is reported close to the day of transaction. Intuition says that an outsider 
would value more a transaction made recently, the information content of a trade 
reported with no delay would be fresher than one reported with delay. 
4.2. Results 
Table VI presents the findings for the cross-sectional regression with 
continuous variables: volume and holdings.  
Volume results suggest that larger purchases are followed by statistically significant 
negative CARs on the 50-day event window, while sales are not statistically significant. 
To test for the robustness of these results, the volume was divided into 20 quintiles 
and the last one (5% biggest transactions) was removed. On Panel 2, for purchases, 
when big transactions are removed (Clean Model), the relation between the two 
variables turns positive. Assuming that very large purchases might be related with 
other motivations rather than possession of information, their exclusion may be the 
explanation behind these new results. On the right-hand side, regressions relative to 
sales: not significant when using the full sample, nevertheless when outliers are 
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removed, the relation starts to be negative (high volume transactions may be related 
with liquidity needs or diversification). Findings on the relevance of very large 
transactions are in consonance with (Jaffe, 1974, Seyhun, 1986 and 1988, Pascutti, 
1996).  
On Panel 1, there is a multivariate regression with volume and holdings. For purchases, 
holdings assume the expected behavior: bigger holdings are associated with bigger 
abnormal returns on the days following the insider transaction. For sales, results are 
not statistically significant. Results are in line with Degryse et al. (2009). 
Table VII shows the findings for the cross-sectional regression with dummy 
variables: size and book to market tertiles and notification delay. A subsample was 
tested by removing transactions reported with delay, assuming that reporting delay is 
influenced by company size (Betzer and Theissen 2010). Theoretically, a smaller firm is 
less scrutinized by CMVM, so has less pressure to comply with the requirements. In 
this sample only 50% of purchases on small firms are reported on time, against 78% for 
large firms. The impact of the use of this subsample is stronger for purchases, where 
average reporting delay is larger. Purchases on small firms only show the expected 
results when delays are removed from the sample, exhibiting a positive relation with 
Table VI – Cross-sectional regression with continuous variables 
In the table below are the results for the cross-sectional regression of CAR with the continuous 
variables. The dependent variable is the CAR (0, 50). First three columns are referring to the 
full sample and the remaining three are referring to a subsample in which only the percentile 
95 of transactions is included. Symbols *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 
5% and 1% level, respectively. For the Panel 1 it is excluded all the observations without 
information about holdings. On Panel 2, the variable holding is dropped. 
Panel 1  Purchases 
 
Sales 
 
Full sample Clean 
 
Full sample Clean 
 
Coef.           t-stat Coef. t-stat 
 
Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat 
Volume -46.32 *** -3.03 - 
 
5.43 0.5 - 
Holdings 1.69 *** 5.90 - 
 
0.41 0.19 - 
N 451  
 
129 
 Panel 2 Purchases  Sales 
 
Full sample Clean  Full sample Clean 
 
Coef.       t-stat Coef.       t-stat  Coef. t-stat Coef.         t-stat 
Volume -20.52 ** -2.25 135.5 ** 2.06  -3.49 -0.60 -68.4 ** -2.10 
N 732 696  241 230 
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CARs, in line with the majority of the empirical research on this variable. Additionally, 
when insiders sell small firms stocks it does not impact the market. Transactions on 
large firms have no impact on CARs when using the full sample which is consistent with 
the hypothesis of less asymmetry of information. However, there is a negative relation 
when removing delayed observations. Insider sales on large firms are associated with 
negative CARs. 
For the book to market tertiles, purchases of undervalued shares (value firms) 
have no impact on the market, against with what was expected. On the other hand, 
sales of overvalued stocks (growth firms) provoke a strong negative market reaction, in 
line with the intuition that insiders are indicating the stock is overpriced. 
Ontime presents results which are consistent with the hypothesis, when a trade 
is reported on time conveys more valuable information to the market. There is a 
stronger market reaction on purchases when trades are notified without delay; 
nonetheless there is no impact on sales notified on time. The explanation for the 
absence of impact on sales may reside on the small number of delays when reporting 
these transactions. 
  
Table VII: Cross-sectional regression with dummy variables 
In the table below are the results for the cross-sectional regression of CAR with the dummy variables. The 
dependent variable is the CAR (0, 50). Full sample represents regressions made with the entire sample 
according with the aggregation used on cross-sectional regression. Excluding delays is a subsample where 
trades reported with delay are excluded. The Symbols *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 
10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 
Purchases  Sales 
 
Full Sample Excluding Delays  Full Sample Excluding Delays 
 
Coef. 
 
t-stat Coef. t-stat  Coef.  t-stat Coef.  t-stat 
Small Cap. -1.53 * -1.36 3.51 *** 2.39  1.23  0.31 4.96  1.08 
Mid Cap. 3.09 ** 2.30 0.21  0.14  11.02 *** 3.71 6.89 ** 1.73 
Large Cap. -0.51 
 
-0.51 -2.44 ** -2.04  -7.91 *** -3.23 -6.43 ** -2.09 
Growth F. 3.36 *** 2.36 5.80 *** 3.50  -6.98 *** -2.87 -8.03 *** -2.74 
Mid F. -2.02 ** -2.01 -2.80 *** -2.39  -0.65  -0.37 -1.53  -0.77 
Value F. 0.34  0.34 -0.03  -0.03  5.14 *** 2.67 6.02 *** 2.83 
On Time 4.07 *** 3.80   -0.41  0.20 - 
N 735 517  241 188 
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5. Limitations 
To understand in more depth this thesis it is important to understand some of 
his limitations. This thesis presents a small dataset in comparison with other 
researches, on the same subject. In the end only 738 events were taken in account. 
From the total of 53 companies existing on PSI-Geral on the chosen period, only 33 
companies are analyzed: 13 were excluded as they did not possess enough information 
to run the event-study due to small market liquidity; remaining 7 were removed as 
consequence of exclusions of observations detailed on Table I. The size of the sample 
complicated the division of insiders into categories (for example: insiders and other 
insiders), this would be interesting to analyze the effect on market reaction according 
with the level of importance of insiders, as well as to see if important insiders may 
behave differently as a consequence of fearing higher scrutiny by the legislators.  
6. Conclusion 
Results suggest that there are no significant abnormal returns on the days 
immediately after transactions. Market reaction is only felt after the communication of 
the trades, when outsiders acknowledge insider trades.  Insiders present an excellent 
timing, by purchasing and selling stocks at the right moment: buying when the stock is 
relatively cheap and selling when the stock is expensive. Overall market reaction is 
stronger for sales than for purchases, against with evidences of various researchers. 
Market reaction is stronger when the trade is reported more closely to the 
transaction date, meaning that outsiders perceive these trades as more valuable in 
terms of information. In the cross-sectional framework, volume is only positively 
associated with positive market reaction after removing outliers, very large volume 
transactions were biasing the results. Purchases on small firms produced negative and 
statistically significant abnormal returns on the full sample, but positive if transactions 
reported with delay are removed. CARs are associated with larger insider holdings, 
which is consistent with the hypothesis that insiders with higher stake may possess 
more important information. 
Contrary to Gonçalves and Duque, 2008, findings show that outsiders may be 
able to earn profits by mimicking insider’s transactions, at least on the 50-day 
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postevent window, especially when transactions are reported closer to the transaction 
date, as shown by the significant short-term market reactions for trades reported on 
time. Gonçalves and Duque, 2008 study, evidence a statistical significant abnormal 
return of 0.76%, on the first 20 days after the transaction, against 0.25% (and not 
significant) of this dissertation. Market reaction evidenced on this dissertation is a sign 
of improvement of the legislation, as insiders are able to acknowledge insider 
transactions. Despite of improvements on stock price informativeness, in relation to 
prior legal frameworks, results still cast doubts over the effectiveness of the actual 
Portuguese insider trading legislation: almost 28% of the trades are reported with 
delay and over than 12% of analyzed trades were reported more than 30 working days 
(over 1 calendar month) after the actual transaction date. Legislation concerning 
reporting period may be reinforced to inform the market in a faster way. 
There are some ways to improve this thesis. Use a larger time series or other 
markets. Create an investment strategy by mimicking the transactions of insiders, 
though it would be difficult to create short-selling portfolios to mimic insiders’ sales, in 
the Portuguese context. Other robustness checks: test the impact of using a clean 
sample, removing events with overlapped estimation and event periods.  
Finally, results suggest that insider trading may be an effective channel to pass 
information for outside investors. Notwithstanding, this dissertation raises some 
questions: Until what extent may outsiders enjoy the same magnitude of profits of 
insider? What is the current amount of trades that are made by persons not legally 
associated with insiders using insider information? 
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